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Research Article
The July 7, 2005 (7/7), bombings on the London 
Underground and bus transport system were an Al Qaeda 
attack orchestrated by three British-born Muslims from 
Pakistani immigrant families and one Jamaican man who 
had converted to Islam. The attack left 52 people dead 
and 770 injured. The 7/7 bombings are the first and only 
major terrorist attack to have affected London this 
century.
Public reactions following major terrorist incidents, 
such as the November 13, 2015, attacks on Paris, are 
often difficult to gauge, because the aftermath provokes 
a focus on the horror of the attack and the trauma suf-
fered by victims. But beyond these immediate reactions, 
research is necessary to test whether such incidents 
polarize people’s existing ideologies, as might be sug-
gested by terror-management theory (Greenberg & Jonas, 
2003), or shift people only toward the conservative end 
of the spectrum, as suggested by the motivated-social-
cognition model of conservatism ( Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, 
& Sulloway, 2003).
The present research drew on a unique data set that 
allowed us to compare nationally representative samples 
of the British population about 6 weeks before and 1 
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Abstract
Major terrorist events, such as the recent attacks in Ankara, Sinai, and Paris, can have profound effects on a nation’s 
values, attitudes, and prejudices. Yet psychological evidence testing the impact of such events via data collected 
immediately before and after an attack is understandably rare. In the present research, we tested the independent and 
joint effects of threat (the July 7, 2005, London bombings) and political ideology on endorsement of moral foundations 
and prejudices among two nationally representative samples (combined N = 2,031) about 6 weeks before and 1 month 
after the London bombings. After the bombings, there was greater endorsement of the in-group foundation, lower 
endorsement of the fairness-reciprocity foundation, and stronger prejudices toward Muslims and immigrants. The 
differences in both the endorsement of the foundations and the prejudices were larger among people with a liberal 
orientation than among those with a conservative orientation. Furthermore, the changes in endorsement of moral 
foundations among liberals explained their increases in prejudice. The results highlight the value of psychological 
theory and research for understanding societal changes in attitudes and prejudices after major terrorist events.
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month after the 7/7 bombings. We investigated people’s 
endorsement of fundamental moral principles, their polit-
ical ideology, and their attitudes toward Muslims and 
immigrants. This unique evidence enabled us to test pre-
dictions drawn from moral-foundations theory and from 
theories of political ideology and prejudice.
Moral-Foundations Theory
According to moral-foundations theory (Graham, Haidt, 
& Nosek, 2009; Haidt & Graham, 2007), liberals and con-
servatives prioritize different visions of a good society. 
Liberals prioritize two specific moral foundations—harm-
care and fairness-reciprocity (or fairness). In contrast, 
conservatives prioritize three additional moral founda-
tions—in-group–loyalty (or in-group), authority-respect 
(or authority), and purity-sanctity (or purity).
Moral-foundations theory suggests that each of the 
five foundations may have different associations with 
negative outcomes such as prejudice. Kugler, Jost, and 
Noorbaloochi (2014) showed that the in-group, respect, 
and purity foundations are positively related to inter-
group hostility and discrimination, whereas the harm-
care and fairness-reciprocity foundations are negatively 
related to these variables. In the current research, we 
directly tested whether the 7/7 attacks affected people’s 
prioritization of different moral foundations and whether 
different moral foundations were associated with preju-
dices toward Muslims and immigrants. Muslims can be 
considered the immediately relevant out-group for the 
majority of the population because the terrorist attack 
was directly linked to Islamic fundamentalism; immi-
grants can be considered a more general out-group 
because the attackers were non-White and second- 
generation immigrants.
Conservatism as Motivated 
Social Cognition
People may adopt ideological belief systems to satisfy 
their psychological needs (e.g., to reduce threat). 
Conservatism is associated with lowered fear and uncer-
tainty, the avoidance of change and ambiguity, and the 
justification of inequality ( Jost et al., 2003). An important 
social psychological insight is that, beyond individual 
differences associated with conservatism, conservative 
tendencies can be affected by contextual changes. 
Various studies using limited ad hoc or student samples 
have shown that participants respond to contextual 
threats by shifting toward conservative positions (e.g., 
Bonanno & Jost, 2006; Echebarria-Echabe & Fernández-
Guede, 2006; Florian, Mikulincer, & Hirschberger, 2001; 
Landau et al., 2004; McGregor, Nail, Marigold, & Kang, 
2005; McGregor, Zanna, Holmes, & Spencer, 2001; Ullrich 
& Cohrs, 2007).
Drawing on the motivated-social-cognition theory of 
Jost et al. (2003), Nail, McGregor, Drinkwater, Steele, and 
Thompson (2009) proposed, and provided experimental 
evidence for, the reactive-liberals hypothesis, which pro-
poses that conservatives constantly feel under threat and 
are therefore less reactive to situational threats than are 
liberals, who become more attitudinally conservative fol-
lowing situational threats (see also Hetherington & 
Weiler, 2009). Indeed, van der Toorn, Nail, Liviatan, and 
Jost (2014) also showed that after experimental threat 
manipulations, liberals became more patriotic, but con-
servatives did not. This shift effectively eliminated their 
previous ideological gap in patriotism.
Nevertheless, other research has shown that liberals 
become more liberal after threats, whereas conservatives 
become more conservative (Castano et  al., 2011), and 
that people high in authoritarianism actually respond to 
threat more strongly than people low in authoritarianism 
(Feldman & Stenner, 1997). The current research directly 
tested the reactive-liberals hypothesis by exploring 
whether liberals became more attitudinally conservative 
after the 7/7 bombings.
The Present Research
Prior research has indicated that liberals and conserva-
tives prioritize different moral foundations and that threats 
may produce greater increases in conservatism among 
liberals than among conservatives. Recent research has 
reconciled the moral-foundations theory and the moti-
vated-social-cognition theory to examine social attitudes 
(e.g., Kugler et al., 2014; Van Leeuwen & Park, 2009). This 
is an essential step in the literature given that both theo-
ries examine people’s attitudes as a function of their polit-
ical ideology. We propose that psychological accounts 
of  social responses to threat (Bassett, Van Tongeren, 
Green, Sonntag, & Kilpatrick, 2015; Echebarria-Echabe & 
Fernández-Guede, 2006) can also be enriched by integrat-
ing insights from these two theories.
A significant limitation of prior research has been the 
use of relatively small-scale student or opportunity sam-
ples, which makes it difficult to evaluate the generaliz-
ability or the real-world implications of theory and 
evidence. In the present research, we addressed this limi-
tation by using two nationally representative samples sur-
veyed about 6 weeks before and 1 month after the 7/7 
bombings. We tested (a) whether a major ter rorist event 
affected moral foundations and prejudice, (b) whether 
this effect differed among liberals and conservatives, and 
(c) whether effects of threat and political orientation on 
prejudice were mediated by specific moral foundations.
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Hypotheses
On the basis of the motivated-social-cognition theory 
and moral-foundations theory, we hypothesized that the 
elevated  threat from the 7/7 bombings should increase 
(a) people’s prioritization of conservative relative to liberal 
foundations and (b) people’s prejudice. On the basis of the 
reactive-liberals hypothesis we predicted that this effect 
would be larger among liberals than among conservatives. 
Thus, differences in threat (before 7/7 vs. after 7/7) should 
interact with political orientation to predict prioritization of 
moral foundations and prejudice. Finally, we predicted 
that differences in endorsement of the foundations before 
and after 7/7 should explain differences in prejudices.
Method
Participants and design
Two cross-sectional nationally representative surveys 
designed by Abrams and Houston (2006) were conducted 
approximately 6 weeks before and 1 month after the July 
7 attacks in London. Participant age ranged from 16 to 98 
years (M = 45.76, SD = 19.18). The majority of participants 
were White (87.1%) and non-Muslim (95.4%). London resi-
dents made up 14.4% of respondents (for further informa-
tion, see the Supplemental Material available online).
Procedure
TNS United Kingdom (U.K.) was commissioned by the 
U.K. government’s Women and Equality Unit (now called 
the Government Equalities Office) to collect the data 
through its omnibus face-to-face computer-assisted per-
sonal interviews survey series (for details of the method 
and measures employed for the two surveys in the pres-
ent research, see Abrams & Houston, 2006). Sample sizes 
were prescribed and defined to provide reliable data 
from a representative sample of the British population. 
We were not involved in the recruitment or interviewing 
of respondents. The two surveys used identical sampling 
and interview methods and were administered to nation-
ally representative samples of people who were older 
than 16 years and resided in England, Scotland, or Wales. 
To avoid response sets and biases, we counterbalanced 
left and right scale anchor points between participants 
and rotated item orders within sections of the survey.
Measures
Moral foundations. Four of the five moral foundations 
were assessed in this research (i.e., in-group–loyalty, author-
ity-respect, fairness-reciprocity, and harm-care). Each of 
these is clearly relevant to the social implications of a terror-
ist attack because such attacks may directly threaten the 
national in-group, may directly challenge authority (which 
governments usually try to reassert rapidly), may instigate 
media focus on whether some groups are being treated 
unfairly (e.g., whether Muslims or immigrants have “too 
many rights”), and may prompt governments to debate 
whether to retaliate and inflict harm on the terrorists (e.g., 
wage a “war on terror”; see Breton, 2010; Clarke, 2008; Lan-
dau et  al., 2004). At the time of the surveys, the moral-
foundations theory was in its infancy (Haidt & Joseph, 
2004); therefore, we operationalized these four moral foun-
dations by using two measures from a short form of the 
Schwartz Values Inventory (Schwartz, 2003) and two other 
measures developed by us for the purposes of this survey. 
We recognize that these are not perfect measures of moral 
foundations. Nevertheless, the moral-foundations frame-
work provides a useful way to specify predictions for the 
different types of measures, and we carefully mapped the 
measures onto the definitions of relevant moral foundations 
as defined by Haidt and Graham (2007, pp. 103–105).
In-group–loyalty. The in-group foundation was assessed 
by asking participants to rate their agreement with the fol-
lowing item: “I feel loyal to Britain despite any faults it may 
have.” Participants responded on a scale from 1 (strongly 
disagree) to 5 (strongly agree).
Authority-respect. The authority foundation was 
assessed by asking participants to rate the extent to 
which they believed that people should do what they are 
told. Specifically, participants responded to the item “I 
think people should follow rules at all times, even when 
no-one is watching.” They responded on a scale from 1 
(not at all like me) to 6 (very much like me).
Harm-care. The harm foundation was assessed by 
asking participants to respond to the item “I want every-
one to be treated justly, even people I do not know. It is 
important to me to protect the weak in society.” Partici-
pants responded on a scale from 1 (not at all like me) to 
6 (very much like me).
Fairness-reciprocity. The fairness foundation was 
assessed by asking participants to rate their agreement 
with the following item: “There should be equality for all 
groups in Britain.” Participants responded on a scale from 
1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree).
Negative attitudes toward Muslims. Participants 
were asked to rate their agreement with the following 
two items: “Britain would begin to lose its identity if more 
Muslims came to live in Britain” and “British Muslims are 
more loyal to other Muslims around the world than they 
are to other people in Britain.” Participants responded on 
a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). 
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The items correlated significantly (r = .49, p < .001), and 
a mean score was calculated.
Negative attitudes toward immigrants. Participants 
were asked to rate their agreement with the following 
two items: “Government spends too much money assist-
ing immigrants (people who come to settle in Britain)” 
and “Immigrants increase crime rates.” Participants 
responded on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 
(strongly agree). The items correlated significantly (r = 
.58, p < .001), and a mean score was calculated.
Political orientation. Participants’ political orientation 
was measured using the following item: “Political views 
can be described as more left wing (e.g., traditional 
Labour Party) or more right wing (e.g., Conservative 
Party). How would you describe your political view?” 
Participants responded on a scale from 1 (definitely left) 
to 6 (definitely right); 38% defined themselves as left 
wing, 35% as right wing, and 28% as neither. This result 
maps onto public opinion polls of the time (Ipsos MORI, 
2015). Any participants who did not respond to this mea-
sure were assigned the mean score (M = 3.40, SD = 1.29) 
to reflect that they did not express a preference for either 
side of the political spectrum.
Results
Preliminary analyses
Muslim participants were excluded from analyses (4.6% 
across samples). Table S1 in the Supplemental Material 
reports the correlations as well as means, standard devia-
tions, and confidence intervals for the key variables of 
interest within the pre-7/7 and post-7/7 data sets. There 
were some significant relationships among participants’ 
self-defined race, religion, age, whether they lived in or 
near London, and their attitudes and endorsement of 
moral foundations. To adjust for these demographic char-
acteristics, we included them as covariates in subsequent 
analyses. However, it is worth noting that even when 
these covariates were not included, the results were 
unchanged: Significant effects remained significant, and 
nonsignificant effects remained nonsignificant.
Moderation analyses
Moderation analyses were conducted to test whether time 
(before 7/7 vs. after 7/7) interacted with political orienta-
tion to predict (a) endorsement of the in-group founda-
tion, (b) endorsement of the fairness foundation, (c) 
endorsement of the authority foundation, (d) endorsement 
of the harm foundation, (e) attitudes toward Muslims, and 
(f) attitudes toward immigrants.
In-group foundation. There was a significant interac-
tive effect of time and political orientation, b = −0.09, 
SE = 0.04, 95% CI = [−0.16, −0.02], t(1922) = −2.49, p = 
.013, on the endorsement of the in-group foundation (see 
Table S2 in the Supplemental Material). Conditional 
effects revealed that time increased endorsement of the 
in-group foundation among liberals, b = 0.21, SE = 0.06, 
95% CI = [0.10, 0.32], t(1922) = 3.71, p < .001, but not 
among conservatives, b = 0.01, SE = 0.06, 95% CI = [−0.10, 
0.12], t(1922) = 0.22, p > .250. Put differently, the differ-
ence in endorsement of the in-group foundation between 
liberals and conservatives before 7/7, b = 0.10, SE = 0.03, 
95% CI = [0.05, 0.16], t(1922) = 4.03, p < .001, disappeared 
after 7/7, b = 0.02, SE = 0.02, 95% CI = [−0.03, 0.06], 
t(1922) = 0.61, p > .250 (see Fig. 1).
Fairness foundation. There was a significant interac-
tive effect of time and political orientation, b = 0.10, SE = 
0.04, 95% CI = [0.03, 0.17], t(1922) = 2.72, p = .007, on 
endorsement of the fairness foundation (see Table S2 in 
the Supplemental Material). Conditional effects revealed 
that time reduced endorsement of the fairness foundation 
among liberals, b = −0.19, SE = 0.06, 95% CI = [−0.30, 
−0.08], t(1922) = −3.40, p < .001, but not among conserva-
tives, b = 0.02, SE = 0.06, 95% CI = [−0.09, 0.13], t(1922) = 
0.41, p > .250. Put differently, the difference in endorse-
ment of the fairness foundation between liberals and 
conservatives before 7/7, b = −0.09, SE = 0.03, 95% 
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Fig. 1. Results for the in-group foundation. The graph shows endorse-
ment of the in-group foundation before and after the July 7, 2005, 
London bombings, separately for liberals (i.e., participants 1 SD above 
the mean for political orientation, and above the scale’s midpoint) and 
conservatives (i.e., those 1 SD below the mean for political orientation, 
and below the scale’s midpoint). Error bars represent ±1 SE of the con-
ditional effect of time on endorsement of the in-group foundation at 
values of political orientation.
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CI = [−0.14, −0.04], t(1922) = −3.59, p < .001, disappeared 
after 7/7, b = 0.004, SE = 0.02, 95% CI = [−0.04, 0.05], 
t(1922) = 0.17, p > .250 (see Fig. 2).
Authority foundation. Contrary to expectations, our 
results revealed no significant main effect of time, b = 
−0.13, SE = 0.22, 95% CI = [−0.55, 0.30], t(1922) = −0.58, 
p > .250, political orientation, b = 0.05, SE = 0.10, 95% 
CI = [−0.15, 0.24], t(1922) = 0.47, p > .250, or their inter-
action, b = 0.04, SE = 0.06, 95% CI = [−0.08, 0.16], 
t(1922) = 0.67, p > .250, on endorsement of the authority 
foundation.
Harm foundation. Again, contrary to expectations, 
our results revealed no significant main effect of time, b = 
−0.18, SE = 0.14, 95% CI = [−0.46, 0.10], t(1922) = −1.26, 
p = .208, political orientation, b = −0.08, SE = 0.06, 95% 
CI = [−0.20, 0.04], t(1922) = −1.26, p = .209, or their inter-
action, b = 0.04, SE = 0.04, 95% CI = [−0.04, 0.12], t(1922) = 
1.05, p > .250, on endorsement of the harm foundation.
Attitudes toward Muslims. There was a significant 
interactive effect of time and political orientation on atti-
tudes toward Muslims, b = −0.08, SE = 0.04, 95% CI = 
[−0.15, −0.01], t(1922) = −2.12, p = .034 (see Table S2 in 
the Supplemental Material). Time increased negative atti-
tudes among liberal participants, b = 0.13, SE = 0.06, 95% 
CI = [0.02, 0.24], t(1922) = 2.34, p = .020, but did not affect 
attitudes among conservative participants, b = −0.04, SE = 
0.06, 95% CI = [−0.15, 0.07], t(1922) = −0.64, p > .250. Put 
differently, the difference between liberals’ and conserva-
tives’ attitudes was greater before 7/7, b = 0.14, SE = 0.03, 
95% CI = [0.09, 0.19], t(1922) = 5.36, p < .001, than after 
7/7, b = 0.06, SE = 0.03, 95% CI = [0.01, 0.11], t(1922) = 
2.53, p = .012 (see Fig. 3).
Attitudes toward immigrants. There was a signifi-
cant interactive effect of time and political orientation on 
attitudes toward immigrants, b = −0.09, SE = 0.04, 95% 
CI = [−0.16, −0.01], t(1922) = −2.28, p = .023 (see Table S2 
in the Supplemental Material). Time increased negative 
attitudes among liberal participants, b = 0.22, SE = 0.06, 
95% CI = [0.10, 0.33], t(1922) = 3.63, p < .001, but did not 
affect attitudes among conservative participants, b = 0.03, 
SE = 0.06, 95% CI = [−0.09, 0.14], t(1922) = 0.45, p > .250. 
Put differently, the difference between liberals’ and con-
servatives’ attitudes was greater before 7/7, b = 0.16, SE = 
0.03, 95% CI = [0.11, 0.22], t(1922) = 5.92, p < .001, than 
after 7/7, b = 0.08, SE = 0.03, 95% CI = [0.02, 0.13], 
t(1922) = 2.90, p = .004 (see Fig. 4).
Moderated mediation analyses
If our integration of the reactive-liberal hypothesis and 
moral-foundations theory is correct, the combined effects 
of political orientation and the 7/7 attack on prejudice 
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Fig. 2. Results for the fairness foundation. The graph shows endorse-
ment of the fairness foundation before and after the July 7, 2005, Lon-
don bombings, separately for liberals (i.e., participants 1 SD above the 
mean for political orientation, and above the scale’s midpoint) and 
conservatives (i.e., those 1 SD below the mean for political orienta-
tion, and below the scale’s midpoint). Error bars represent ±1 SE of the 
conditional effect of time on endorsement of the fairness foundation at 
values of political orientation.
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Fig. 3. Results for attitudes toward Muslims. The graph shows preju-
dice toward Muslims before and after the July 7, 2005, London bomb-
ings, separately for liberals (i.e., participants 1 SD above the mean for 
political orientation, and above the scale’s midpoint) and conservatives 
(i.e., those 1 SD below the mean for political orientation, and below the 
scale’s midpoint). Error bars represent ±1 SE of the conditional effect 
of time on attitudes toward Muslims at values of political orientation.
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should be mediated by differences in endorsement of 
moral foundations. Because we observed a similar pat-
tern of results for the endorsement of the in-group and 
fairness foundations and for prejudice, we used moder-
ated mediation analyses (Hayes, 2013, Model 8) to test 
the hypothesis that higher endorsement of the in-group 
foundation and lower endorsement of the fairness foun-
dation mediate the interactive effect of time and political 
orientation on attitudes toward Muslims and attitudes 
toward immigrants.
Attitudes toward Muslims. Results revealed that 
endorsement of the in-group foundation (indirect effect: 
b = −0.01, SE = 0.01, 95% CI = [−0.03, −0.003]) and the 
fairness foundation (indirect effect: b = −0.02, SE = 0.01, 
95% CI = [−0.03, −0.003]) significantly mediated the inter-
active effect of time and political orientation on attitudes 
toward Muslims. Specifically, the significant interactive 
effect of time and political orientation on attitudes toward 
Muslims reported earlier was eliminated when we 
accounted for the effects of endorsement of the in-group 
and fairness foundations, b = −0.05, SE = 0.04, 95% CI = 
[−0.12, 0.02], t(1920) = −1.38, p = .168. Note that endorse-
ment of the in-group foundation mediated the effect of 
time on attitudes among liberals, b = 0.03, SE = 0.01, 95% 
CI = [0.01, 0.05], but not among conservatives, b = 0.002, 
SE = 0.01, 95% CI = [−0.01, 0.02]. Likewise, endorsement 
of the fairness foundation mediated the effect of time on 
attitudes only among liberals, b = 0.03, SE = 0.01, 95% 
CI = [0.01, 0.05], and not among conservatives, b = −0.004, 
SE = 0.01, 95% CI = [−0.02, 0.02] (see Fig. 5).
Attitudes toward immigrants. Results revealed that 
endorsement of the in-group foundation indirect effect (b = 
−0.01, SE = 0.01, 95% CI = [−0.03, −0.003]) and endorse-
ment of the fairness foundation (indirect effect: b = −0.02, 
SE = 0.01, 95% CI = [−0.04, −0.004]) significantly mediated 
the interactive effect of time and political orientation on 
attitudes toward immigrants. Specifically, the significant 
interactive effect of time and political orientation on atti-
tudes toward immigrants reported earlier was eliminated 
when we accounted for the effects of endorsement of the 
in-group and fairness foundations, b = −0.05, SE = 0.04, 
t(1920) = −1.44, p = .151, 95% CI = [−0.13, 0.02]. Endorse-
ment of the in-group foundation mediated the effect of 
time on attitudes among liberals, b = 0.03, SE = 0.01, 95% 
CI = [0.01, 0.06], but not among conservatives, b = 0.002, 
SE = 0.01, 95% CI = [−0.01, 0.02]. Likewise, endorsement of 
the fairness foundation also mediated the effect of time on 
attitudes only among liberals, b = 0.04, SE = 0.01, 95% CI = 
[0.02, 0.07], but not among conservatives, b = −0.01, SE = 
0.01, 95% CI = [−0.03, 0.02] (see Fig. 5).
Discussion
In the present research, we used data from representa-
tive samples of the British population tested before and 
after the London 7/7 bombings. Participants questioned 
after 7/7 showed greater endorsement of the in-group 
foundation, lower endorsement of the fairness foun-
dation, and greater prejudice toward Muslims and 
immigrants. Moreover, respondents who were more con-
servative (as opposed to liberal) showed greater prioriti-
zation of the in-group foundation, lower prioritization of 
the fairness foundation, and were less favorable toward 
Muslims and immigrants. However, the shift in both the 
foundations and prejudices was larger among those with 
a liberal orientation than among those with a conserva-
tive orientation.
Overall, these results revealed that endorsement of 
the in-group and fairness foundations can be affected 
by changes in the intergroup context. Specifically, when 
an in-group is threatened by a terrorist attack, liberals 
become just as likely as conservatives to value the 
in-group foundation (measured as loyalty to the in-
group)—which is usually valued more by conservatives. 
Furthermore, liberals reduce their prioritization of the 
fairness foundation (measured as support for equality 
for all groups), which is more in line with a conserva-
tive position. The changes in endorsement of these 
foundations among liberals predicted greater prejudice 
toward Muslims and immigrants. Therefore, after threat, 
liberals became more intolerant of outgroups, and this 
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Fig. 4. Results for attitudes toward immigrants. The graph shows 
prejudice toward immigrants before and after the July 7, 2005, Lon-
don bombings, separately for liberals (i.e., participants 1 SD above the 
mean for political orientation, and above the scale’s midpoint) and 
conservatives (i.e., those 1 SD below the mean for political orienta-
tion, and below the scale’s midpoint). Error bars represent ±1 SE of the 
conditional effect of time on attitudes toward immigrants at values of 
political orientation.
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effect was explained by the endorsement of in-group 
and fairness foundations.
These findings have a number of implications. For 
psychological theory, these findings establish a meaning-
ful connection between moral-foundations theory (Haidt 
& Graham, 2007) and motivated-social-cognition theory 
( Jost et al., 2003). This is an important bridge that should 
stimulate future research. The findings show that peo-
ple’s moral foundations depend on context. The results 
also show that not all foundations are affected by threat 
equally, perhaps because some foundations are more rel-
evant to the specific contextual change (i.e., the terrorist 
attack) than others (Breton, 2010; Clarke, 2008). Indeed, 
the idea that some foundations are more relevant to the 
specific contextual change than others is consistent with 
the correlational findings showing that endorsement of 
the in-group and fairness foundations correlates more 
strongly with prejudice scores both before and after 7/7 
than does endorsement of the authority and harm foun-
dations. The correlations between both measures of pre-
judice and endorsement of the in-group and fairness 
foundations (|r| range: .15–.19) were all significantly dif-
ferent from the correlations between both measures of 
prejudice and endorsement of the authority and harm 
foundations (|r| range: .01–.09), pairwise t(1934)s ≥ 2.50, 
ps < .01 (see the Supplemental Material). Future research 
should continue to develop the cross-connections be-
tween moral-foundations theory and motivated-social-
cognition theory.
For people working to tackle prejudice, it is important 
to be aware that terror events may have different effects 
on the attitudes of people who start from different politi-
cal orientations. Among people who tend to be conserva-
tive, such events may consolidate their existing priorities, 
making them resistant to change. Among people who 
tend to be liberal, the same events may prompt a shift in 
their priorities and propel them toward more prejudiced 
attitudes. Therefore, different interventions may be 
required to tackle these responses.
For policy strategists who wish to strengthen national 
solidarity around shared values, it may be important to 
recognize the danger that national solidarity itself could 
promote in-group loyalty, which may result in population 
shifts toward prejudice rather than away from it. This risk 
arises from the shift from what Abrams (2010) termed 
harmonious cohesion to rivalrous cohesion that can fol-
low intergroup conflict (Abrams & Vasiljevic, 2014; cf. 
Sherif, 1966).
We are aware of the limitations of the present research. 
The use of matched rather than longitudinal samples 
means that we can examine change at the level of soci-
etal attitudes rather than change in individual attitudes. 
It could be argued that our findings are due to a failure 
to replicate differences between liberals and conserva-
tives after 7/7. Additional measurement points would 
also have provided insight into the time course and 
duration of changes. To overcome these limitations, we 
performed additional data analyses on data sets from 
British Social Attitudes Survey (BSAS) samples similar 
to  those in our main analysis. The relevant BSAS data 
were collected in 2005 (beginning in August) and in 
2008 (National Centre for Social Research, 2007, 2010). 
b = –0.20***
Political Orientation
Time
Time ×
Political Orientation
b = 0.19***
b = –0.19***
b = 0.14***
Endorsement of the
Fairness Foundation
Endorsement of the
In-Group Foundation
Attitudes Toward
Muslims
Attitudes Toward
Immigrants
b = –0.41**
b =
 0.
42
**
b =
 –0
.16
***
b =
 –0
.09
*
b =
 0.1
0**
b = 0.15***
Fig. 5. Path diagram for the moderated mediation analysis showing the influence of political orientation, time, and their inter-
action on attitudes toward Muslims and immigrants, as mediated by endorsement of the in-group and fairness foundations. 
Asterisks indicate significant paths (*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001).
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We expected that the differences between liberals and 
conservatives that appeared before 7/7 and that were 
diminished after 7/7 would reemerge and, in the absence 
of a repeat attack of similar magnitude, remain relatively 
stable. Our own data showed that the strength of asso-
ciation between political orientation and attitudes toward 
immigrants before 7/7, Cohen’s d = 0.39, r = .19, N = 931, 
was significantly reduced after 7/7, Cohen’s d = 0.18, r = 
.09, N = 1,100. Analyses of the BSAS data demonstrated 
that, as expected, the association between political ori-
entation and attitudes toward immigrants had strength-
ened again later in 2005, Cohen’s d = 0.39, r = .19, N = 
289, and remained consistent in 2008, Cohen’s d = 0.39, 
r = .19, N = 2,072 (for further information, see the 
Supplemental Material).
In the current research, we used indirect measures 
(rather than direct matches) to tap into four of the five 
moral foundations. The different measures do clearly and 
distinctively map onto the in-group, harm, authority, and 
fairness foundations. Conceptually, therefore, they are 
informative about the relative importance of these differ-
ent foundations. We are aware that the particular items 
may also tap other constructs that are not central to 
moral-foundations theory. However, the findings provide 
powerful society-level evidence that is in line with past 
experimental or opportunity sample research showing 
that, after contextual threats, liberals shift toward conser-
vative positions (e.g., Nail et  al., 2009; van der Toorn 
et al., 2014). Therefore, the present findings provide valu-
able insights into the larger societal implications and 
thus the real-world relevance of predictions from moral- 
foundations theory and motivated-social-cognition the-
ory. Moreover, pursuing the measurement issues and 
potential limitations offers interesting avenues for future 
research into the impact of terrorist events.
The present findings provide a rare example of sub-
stantial psychological data from a survey containing rel-
evant measures administered before and after a major 
terrorist event, allowing us to examine the impact on the 
national population. Furthermore, the data were col-
lected by an independent organization that had no insight 
into our hypotheses or interest in the responses and that 
used extremely rigorous methodology. Thus, we have 
considerable confidence in the quality and interpretabil-
ity of the data.
The post-7/7 evidence has not been available for pub-
lication until now. However, the 7/7 attack remains highly 
salient in the United Kingdom, which held 10th-anniver-
sary commemorations in July 2015. Sadly, besides the 
Charlie Hebdo attack that stunned Paris in January, there 
have been nearly 300 terror attacks around the world in 
2015. In the 4 months during which this article was being 
revised and finalized, there were 12 major terror attacks, 
each with more than 50 fatalities, including attacks in 
Ankara (Turkey), Beirut (Lebanon), Kabul (Afghanistan), 
Kahn Bani Saad (Iraq), Kukawa (Nigeria), Paris (France), 
and Sinai (Egypt). These have often been followed by 
strong political responses from governments and, in 
some cases, by military responses. Understanding the 
psychological responses to these events, and their poten-
tial effects in facilitating or constraining retaliatory or 
defensive political reactions, is an important avenue for 
future research.
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